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After Action Report
Operation Starlite: The First Big Battle (17-24 August 1965)
When the 9th Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) came across Red Beach in Danang, Republic of
Vietnam, under the command of Brigadier General Frederick J. Karch,
USMC, on 8 March, 1965, it had orders to “dig in and hold”. The Army of
the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was in command and, according to BGen
Karch’s statement to the press: “Our job is to secure the area. We’ll be
operating strictly in a defensive role”.
So, while the South Vietnamese
troops were free to seek out and engage the enemy, Marines were pretty
much confined to “behind the wire”. The Danang “enclave” was referred to
by some Marines as “The Alamo”. From “The Alamo”, Marines could fire
only when fired upon. In some instances, Marines observed “troops in the
open”; but by the time they could obtain permission to shoot, the
opportunity was lost.
Further to the south in an area called Chu Lai*, 55
miles from Danang, things were a bit different. In June of 1965, the
Marine Radio Battalion intercepted and reported an increase in message
traffic between several known Viet Cong units concentrated on and around
the Van Tuong Peninsula, 15 miles south of the Chu Lai enclave. The
Marine cantonment included a new U.S.-built airfield. These intercepts
alerted the aerial intelligence collection assets which confirmed
“unusual activity” including the building of bunkers and other
positions.
During mid-August, 1965, an enemy deserter
informed his interrogators that the 60th and the 80th Viet Cong
Battalions, with reinforcement from the 52nd Weapons Battalion,
comprised a unit called the First Viet Cong Regiment. This 1,500-man
regiment intended to attack the just-being-built Chu Lai enclave and
airfield from its staging area on the Van Tuong Peninsula.
Army General Westmoreland, the Commander in charge of
all military operations in Vietnam, located in Saigon, and his staff,
grew increasingly concerned that the Viet Cong were preparing to mount
an attack on Chu Lai with “up to 3 regiments of Viet Cong”. The concern
was shared by LtGen Lewis Walt, Commanding General of the III Marine
Amphibious Force (MAF). Gen. Westmoreland “encouraged” Gen. Walt to take
the offensive. Gen. Walt “reminded” Gen. Westmoreland of the 6 May
letter limiting Marines to support of the ARVN. Gen. Westmoreland told
Walt that these constraints were “no longer realistic” and ordered Gen.
Walt to re-write the Rules of Engagement. Gen. Walt did so and on 6
August Gen. Westmoreland gave Gen. Walt “official permission to take
offensive action against the enemy”. A week later the 7th Marines landed
in Chu Lai. RLT 7, reinforced with by Capt Allen W. Lamb’s, “B” Company,
1st Tank Bn., was commanded by Col. Oscar F. Peatross. BLT 1/7,
reinforced by the 1st Platoon, “B” Company, 1st Tanks, arrived on 14
August.
Third Tank Battalion, headquartered in Danang,
had already deployed some of its tanks to the Chu Lai Tactical Area of
Responsibility (TOAR) in support of the 3rd Marines (A Company,
commanded by Capt. Fidelas W. Jarnot) and the 4th Marines (C Company,
commanded by Capt. Joe P. Sanders).
With increased enemy activity reported around the Van
Tuong village complex and the arrival of the 7th Marines – along with
permission to engage the enemy - Gen Walt and his staff flew to Chu Lai.
There was but one of 2 choices – sit and wait for the Viet Cong to
attack or take the battle to the enemy. Predictably, the Marines chose
the latter and Col. Peatross was given command of the attacking force.
Col. Don Wyckoff, Third Marine Division Operations Officer, designated
the operation “Satellite” but as a young PFC smoothed out the plan, the
generators failed and the clerk – with only a candle for light, altering
history – typed “Starlite” instead of “Satellite” throughout the
document.
The operation was to be a 2
battalion assault – Lieutenant Colonel Fisher’s 2nd Battalion, 4th
Marines and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Muir’s 3rd Battalion, 3rd
Marines. One battalion – LtCol Muir’s - was to land across the beach and
one battalion – LtCol fisher’s - was to land by helicopter further
inland. A third battalion, the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines – BLT 3/7,
reinforced by 2Lt. Raymond A. Stewart’s 3rd Platoon (rein), “B” Company,
1st Tanks embarked on the Point Defiance LSD 31 – commanded by LtCol
Charles H. Bodley, was designated as the floating reserve. Artillery
support was to be provided by Marine Batteries in Chu Lai. Naval Guns
were on call and MAGs -11 and -12 were to fly Close Air with Helicopter
Squadrons 261 & 361 supporting the vertical envelopment.
If the creation of the attacking regimental-size force
under Col. Peatross – drawing units from both the 1st and 3rd Marine
Divisions (3rd Marines from Okinawa, 4th Marines from Hawaii, and 7th
Marines from Camp Pendleton was complicated and difficult, Capt. Lamb’s
supporting job was no less so. He was tasked to provide tank – both gun
and flame – support into an area 12-15 miles south of Chu Lai that was
only marginally “tank country.”
On 17 August selected 1st and
3rd Tank Battalion tanks loaded into amphibious shipping for the
amphibious assault while others moved overland from Chu Lai to link up
for the follow-on assault on the 1st VC Regiment bunkered on the Van
Tuong Peninsula.
On 18 August, Company B (-)(rein) moved out. It
consisted of: Co. B(-), 1st TkBn, FMF,
3d Plat, Co. A, 3dTkBn, FMF, Sec. 2d Plat, Co. C, 3dTkBn, FMF, Co. B(-)
consisted of (1) Gun Tank, three (3) Flame Tanks, and a VTR,M51.
Total Strength: 3 Officers USMC
43 Enlisted USMC
1 Enlisted
USN
The tank elements were organized into three separate increments.
The section of 2d Plat, Co. C
was attached to LtCol Fisher’s BLT 2/4. 3d Plat, Co. A was attached to
Lt. Col Muir’s BLT 3/3. Capt. Lamb’s Company B(-) was with Hq, RLT-7 in
a General Support role.
Battalion Landing Team 3/3, after an amphibious landing
with Gun Tanks, Flame Tanks, and Ontos, and 2/4, with their supporting
tanks attached, joined up outside the Hamlet of An Cuong (2). The
terrain was “primarily rolling, weeded or brush-covered interspersed
with dry crop fields, wet rice paddies, and paddy dikes”. Hedgerows of
small trees and brush from 6-10 feet divided up the terrain.
From the heavy brush, the well-concealed enemy knocked
out A34 with an RPG. A section of Company C tanks assisted in evacuating
the A34 crew then returned to the 2/4 defensive positions. Then, a light
section (2 tanks) of 3d Plat, Co. A found itself without supporting
infantry and wisely returned to 2/4’s position. A33 escorted A35, which
had experienced “track problems”, returning to the beach.
At approx. 1100, India Company,
3/3 in contact with the enemy requested Flames at their position. The
route between the RLT Hq. and India Company was reported “clear”. The
Flames fell in with a 5 LVTs resupply convoy. The convoy, after passing
Hotel Company 2/4, which had supporting tanks, got lost. The convoy,
following a trail flanked by trees on one side and rice paddies and
hedgerows on the other, was ambushed. “As the two lead vehicles, a tank
and an amtrac, went around a bend in the road, an explosion occurred
near the lead tank, followed by another in the middle of the column.”
The enemy opened up with RPGs, mortars, and small arms. B55 was hit and
put out of action. The wounded crew was evacuated.
The LVTs, attempting to avoid contact, drove into a
rice paddy and immediately bogged down. B53, having expended its .30
cal. ammunition and with its .50 cal. out of action, had its’ driver
wounded by blown out fragments of the driver’s periscope. The enemy,
taking advantage of the lack of infantry support for the tanks, ran
right up to the tank and laid a satchel charge on the drivers hatch,
blowing the periscope vision blocks down onto the driver. B53 then broke
contact and returned to RLT CP.
Understanding the difficulties
the convoy was experiencing, a reaction force from BLT 3/3 mounted out,
with B51 as an escort, on LVTs. In route, the Reaction Force came under
fire. B51 stopped to engage the enemy, running across its direct front,
with its .30 cal. and was hit by an RPG from that direction. As the LVTs
closed up from the rear, they came under fire from the same directions
and then from the flanks. The LVTs dispersed, leaving B51 to fire its
canister. Not being able to determine the exact location of the flanking
fire, B51 broke contact.
Another attempt was made to relieve the beleaguered
column around 1600 with Company L as the Reaction Force and – once again
– B51, along with A33 and the VTR, as escorts. Contact was made with the
enemy. By the time the enemy could be cleared, it was too dark to
determine the location of the “lost” column and the Reaction Force
circled its wagons into a defensive position until first light.
Early on the morning of 19
August 1965, helicopters arrived at the column’s position and began to
evacuate the wounded and KIAs. Companies L and I of 3/7 along with B51,
A33, and the VTR moved into the area as well and assisted in burying the
enemy and evacuating the friendly casualties. Vehicle recovery also was
undertaken. On 20 August vehicle recovery was completed. Unable to
recover one tank - A34 – and one LVT, both were blown in place by the
Engineers.
Company B (-)(rein), 1st Tanks suffered 1 KIA and 13
WIA during Operation Starlite. Its commander, Capt Al Lamb (B51) was
awarded a Silver Star for his heroic action. He retired a Colonel.
“The exploits of the infantry
battalions were only part of the story of the battle. Colonel Peatross
had high praise for both the tank and engineer detachments to his
command”. The 7th Marines Commanding Officer, Colonel Peatross, is
quoted: “The tanks were certainly the difference between extremely heavy
casualties and the number we actually took. Everyplace the tanks went,
they drew a crowd of VC.”
So, the mis-named battle
“Operation Starlite” that “started it all” - with 45 Marines KIAs and
203 WIAs - cost the Viet Cong 614 killed. And, while the Viet Cong were
to never again field a military unit against the Marines, the Marines
continued to win battle after battle for the next five years.
* “Chu Lai” was not an actual
“place” – not found on any map, not even a Vietnamese name - but rather
an unnamed “flat spot to build a runway on.” Unnamed, that is, until
Marine Lt. Gen. Victor Krulak, FMFPac Commander, while flying over the
area on a recon to find a suitable place to build an airfield and
supporting cantonment, named it. “Chu Lai” which are the Mandarin
Chinese characters for “Victor Krulak”.
(Note: Material for this article is taken from the Official Marine Corps
Command Chronologies, Capt. Al Lamb’s After Action Report, “U.S. Marines
in Vietnam – 1965”, and articles by Tom Bartlett appearing in the August
1990 and 1985 “Leatherneck”. You are encouraged to write, call, or
e-mail the Foundation with your comments.)
“C” Company 3rd Tanks
Cpl William C. Laidlaw, KIA.
Wounded in Action
2Lt Peter P. Little
2Lt Ky L. Thompson
SSgt Charles W. Malette
Cpl James B. Thompson
Sgt Daniel H. McQueary
Pfc Daniel M. Yoder
Cpl Charles L. Denton
Sgt Edward V. Sipel
Cpl James E. Williams
“B” Company 1st Tanks
Cpl W.L. Vickey
Pfc V.R. Stanford
Pfc J.E. Hearn
Pfc R.E. Myers
3rd Anti Tank Bn.
Cpl. Robert G. Bouquest, KIA
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